Was the Soviet Union seeking global dominance after World War II or was it merely promoting its own security?

1. Was the Soviet Union seeking global dominance after World War II or was it merely promoting its own security? Your answer should focus on the first decade after World War II.

The Soviet Union has been known throughout its history as a symbol of power and determination. Whilst in hindsight one can clearly see the weaknesses within the pan-national institution, during its height the USSR was a constant threat to the balance of power within Europe and a recurring menace to America’s capitalist plans. In order to answer the question of whether the Soviet Union was seeking global dominance after World War II or merely promoting its own security, one must consider its domestic and foreign behaviours in the first decade after WW2^[a]. Comparing the nature of Soviet activity during and prior to this period as well as post-World War II will give insight into the motivation behind the institution’s workings^[b].

Stalin declared in an address to the Soviet Union’s industrial managers that

“One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness…All beat her – for her backwardness: for military backwardness…for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness.” (Stalin,1940,p365^[c])  

In the decade prior to World War II, the primary focus of the USSR government was on internal reorganisation and the reestablishment of Soviet order.  This was done primarily through a jumpstarting^[d] of the failing Soviet economy by way of structural changes to the previous economic plan. The creation and implementation of both the First Five-Year Plan and the controversial system of collective farms in 1928 held the attention of the Soviet leadership making an aggressive foreign policy an unlikely objective on the political agenda. This focus on the economy was further aggravated by the Great Depression of 1929. Although it did not affect the USSR as greatly as it did other capitalist countries, it reinforced the idea of strengthening the domestic policy of a nation before embarking on ambitious foreign endeavours. According to Robert Service ‘Central state direction of economic development gained in favour as politicians and journalists reported that the Soviet Union was avoiding the financial catastrophe that was engulfing the Western economies’ (Service, 1998,p170^[e])

At this point the USSR was on its way to becoming a world superpower as the rest of the countries in Europe, as well as the United States, struggled to recover their failed economies. ‘According to authoritative western estimates, between 1928 and 1940 the output of civilian industries multiplied 2.6 times.’ (Barber&Harrison,1991,p5) ^[f]

 If there was ever a time for the Soviet time to start planning for global dominance, it was at that specific time when nations were weakened by the Depression. However the attention of the government remained internal as Stalin’s focus prior to the war was the social and cultural progress of the Soviet Union. Stalin shared the goal of all Communist leaders to create a society with a high ‘level of education and technical skills in the population’ (Service,1998,p190). Therefore one can justifiably assume that prior to World War II, global dominance was not an objective of Soviet politics^[g].

Although the initial results of the economic structural change from the NEP to the First and Second Five-year Plans pointed towards fiscal success, there was widespread social resentment due to their violent state-supported enforcement.

‘Kulaks’, railwaymen –‘wreckers’, ‘nationalists’ and managerial ‘saboteurs’ were being arrested in large numbers. Nearly a million Soviet citizens languished in the forced-labour camps and colonies of the OGPU by 1933, and further millions were prisons, deportation camps and compulsory resettlement areas. (Service,1998, p210)

This induced a socially unstable atmosphere which combined with Stalin’s fear of betrayal from Bolshevik opposition within the Communist party brought about the age of the Great Terror. The gradual fall into dissent both within Soviet society and amongst Stalin’s allies created a domestic issue that again, like the economy, drew attention away from any plans centred on foreign expansion in order to stabilize home affairs.

Communist beliefs based on Leninist theory had a large role to play in the USSR’s reluctance to involve itself in international relations. Stalin was reasonably paranoid concerning the re-emergence of war across Europe and would often warn of the dangers of the nature of interaction that was taking place between countries. Leninism taught that economically induced war was inevitable amongst capitalist countries, particularly those with imperialistic inclinations such as the European nations, and these violent power struggles would only come to an end with the destruction of capitalism. ‘…Soviet foreign policy had to start from this first premiss of Leninist theory on international relations.’ (Service,1998^[h],p254)

Soviet presence in foreign affairs was minimal and foreign policy under Stalin prior to WW2 was borderline non-existent. The separatist nature of the Soviet Union encouraged isolationism, particularly in unnecessary involvement in wars that were being fought under imperialist incentives. However the increasingly belligerent climate surrounding Europe forced Stalin to prepare for the worst case scenario.

A significant increase in military activity in the USSR is seen from the winter of 1938-9 as Hitler encroached closer onto Soviet territory.

Broadened regulations on conscription raised the size of the Soviet of the Soviet armed forces from two million men under arms in 1939 to five million by 1941. In the same period there was a leap in factory production of armaments to the level of 700 military aircraft, 4,000 guns and mortars and 100,00 rifles. (Service,1998,p255)

The extensive changes that took place in the Soviet army in terms of its structure, size and its resources reflect the lack of predominance that military activity had in the Soviet political agenda. The limited military capacity of the USSR can also be interpreted to imply a lack of interest in foreign activity as a large army is not a necessity for country whose interests are inwardly orientated.

The USSR did not come out of diplomatic isolation until it was absolutely necessary as is exampled by the negotiations that took place between them, Britain and France once Hitler had occupied Czechoslovakia completely in March 1939. This Soviet wariness of involvement with Britain and France can be traced back to the Spanish Civil War which began in 1936. Britain and France’s failure to prevent Italy and Germany from helping to propagate fascism in Spain put the USSR’s security at risk. Therefore involvement with foreign powers was the ultimate last resort for the Soviet Union showing the desperate nature of the situation. A pact of non-aggression was signed by the Soviet and German foreign ministers on 23 August 1939 that stated that diplomatic negotiation was to be pursued between the two nations if one went to war. The signing of the treaty allowed Germany to gain a foothold in Poland which they fully invaded on 1 September. Two days later, Britain and France declared war signalling the beginning of World War II. (Barber&Harrison, 1991,p19^[i])

A pattern of peace seeking can be seen in the Soviet Union’s actions as Stalin sought first and foremost for the security of his nation. Rather than being quick to take up arms like Britain and France, the USSR sought to use diplomacy as a means to ensure the safety of its states. However this agreeability may have been more a case of a lack of preparedness than of a genuine longing for amity. Leonard Shapiro states that ‘Stalin and the party were to blame for a policy which resulted in a failure to prepare for war’ (Schapiro,1973,p52) Perhaps if the USSR had been more militarily able, a more aggressive foreign policy would have been put into effect. According to Barber and Harrison, ‘Soviet policy prepared continually for war…Because the Soviet rearmament pattern aimed at some future war, it was never ready for war in the present.’ (Barber&Harrison,1991,p16)